Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi v. Woodside Homes
Corporation : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald G. Russell; Timothy B. Smith; Parr Waddoups Brown Gee and Loveless; Attorney for
Appellee.
Stephen Quesenberry; J. Bryan Quesenberry; Hill, Johnson and Schmutz, LC; Attorney for
Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp, No. 20030993 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4683

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ALI S. YAZD, and PARVIN YOUSEFI,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appellants/Plaintiffs,
vs.

Trial Court Case No. 020402197

WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION,
Appellate Case No. 20030993-AC
Appellee/Defendant.

Appeal From the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah
The Honorable Gary D. Stott

Ronald G. Russell (4134)
Timothy B. Smith (8271)
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant

Stephen Quesenberry (8073)
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
3319 North University Ave.
Provo, UT 84604
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs

APPELLANTS REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED DECISION
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 2 f 2004

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALI S. YAZD, and PARVIN YOUSEFI,;
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appellants/Plaintiffs,
vs.

'
'
Trial Court Case No. 020402197

WOODSIDE HOMES CORPORATION,;
Appellate Case No. 20030993-AC
Appellee/Defendant.

Appeal From the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah
The Honorable Gary D. Stott

Ronald G.Russell (4134)
Timothy B. Smith (8271)
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, #1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant

Stephen Quesenberry (8073)
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
3319 North University Ave.
Provo, UT 84604
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs

APPELLANTS REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED DECISION

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

ARGUMENT

1

A.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE BUILDER HAD KNOWLEDGE OF
COLLAPSIBLE SOILS UNDERLYING THE CHURCH SITE . . . 1

B.

THE BUILDER OWED THE HOMEOWNERS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEEP COLLAPSIBLE SOILS IN THE
CHURCH SITE WHICH DIRECTLY ADJOINS THE LOT PURCHASED
BY THE HOMEOWNERS
3

C.

THE COLLAPSIBLE SOIL IN THE CHURCH SITE IS MATERIAL
INFORMATION
6

CONCLUSION

8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A. Cases
Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp.. 182 Cal. App. 2d 325 (1960)

5

Hermansen v. Tasulis. 48 P.3d235 (Utah2002)

1

Loveland v. Orem City Corp.. 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987)

4

McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175 (Utah App. 1997)

1

Strawnv.Canuso. 657 A.2d420 (N.J. 1995)

4

Timm v. Clement. 574 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa App. 1997)

4, 5

Tobin v. Paparone Construction Co.. 137 N.J. Super. 518, 526 (1975)

4

B. Secondary Authorities
Campbell, Colin, Annotation, Liability of Vendor or Real-Estate Broker for Failure to
Disclose Information Concerning Off-Site Conditions Affecting Value of Property. 41
A.L.R.5th 157 (1996)
5

ii

ARGUMENT
The Trial Court inappropriately dismissed on summary judgment the claims of
Appellants Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi ("Homeowners") for fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment. Fraudulent non-disclosure requires that "(1) the
nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v.
Tasuhs, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added). Similarly, "[fraudulent
concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts
remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him." McDougal v.
Weed. 945 P.2d 175,179 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis added).
Although Appellee Woodside Homes Corporation ("Builder") claims it did not
have knowledge (and thus no duty to disclose) regarding the collapsible soil directly
underneath the house it built for the Homeowners ("House"), disputed issues of fact
nevertheless exist regarding whether the Builder fraudulently failed to disclose (or
concealed) its knowledge of collapsible soil underlying the nearby off-site land adjoining
the House.
A.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE BUILDER HAD KNOWLEDGE OF
COLLAPSIBLE SOILS UNDERLYING THE CHURCH SITE
For purposes of summary judgment and the present appeal the Builder concedes

1

that "the court could assume that Woodside had the Delta Report,1 was knowledgeable
about its contents and understood the soil conditions on the Church Site." (Brief of
Appellee at 12.) The Builder obtained this knowledge before it built the House for the
Homeowners.2
Specifically, the Delta Report discloses that the Church Site - a parcel of property
directly adjoining the Homeowners' lot 304 (see. Exhibit B attached to Brief of
Appellants)3 - contained deep collapsible soil which, in some places, went 27 feet deep.
(R at 717, U 11.) These collapsible soils were not miles from the Homeowners' lot, or
even blocks away. They were in the Church Site that touched the Homeowners' lot. In
fact, one test hole on the Church site which was approximately 30 feet from the lot that
the Homeowners subsequently purchased from the Builder, contained approximately eight
feet of collapsible soil. (Rat 7194 31.)
Further, the Builder not only knew of the deep collapsible soil nearby the
Homeowners' lot before the Homeowners purchased it in 1995, but they clearly knew of
the nearby collapsible soil when the Homeowners complained to the Builder in 1997 of
1

As noted in the Homeowners' opening appeal brief, Prior to the LDS Church
selling the LDS parcel to the Builder, the LDS Church engaged Delta Geotechnical
Consultants, Inc. to conduct a soils test on the LDS parcel (R at 715, f 22.) The
Homeowners refer herein to the report of that soils test as the "Delta Report."
2

See. Brief of Appellants at 6-9; Brief of Appellee at 12.

3

In Exhibit B, the Church Site is the "Panorama Point B" parcel.
2

cracking and settlement-related problems with the House.
Accordingly, the Builder's admitted knowledge of the Delta Report and the deep
collapsible soils discussed therein is undisputed for purposes of summary judgment and
the present appeal.
B.

THE BUILDER OWED THE HOMEOWNERS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEEP COLLAPSIBLE SOILS IN THE
CHURCH SITE WHICH DIRECTLY ADJOINS THE LOT PURCHASED
BY THE HOMEOWNERS
In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held that "[bjecause Plaintiffs cannot

establish that Woodside had knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows
that there can be no duty to disclose the information to the Plaintiffs."4 Thus, the Trial
Court stopped at the knowledge requirement of the Homeowners' claims without
independently determining if the Builder owed the Homeowners a duty to disclose its
knowledge of the deep collapsible soils in the nearby Church Site. However, the
Builder's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment concedes that it would owe the Homeowners such a duty. This conclusion is
the result of Builder's summary judgment memoranda omitting any discussion regarding
the duty element of the Homeowners' two fraud claims. (R at 527-537.) In fact, the
Homeowners even noted the omission by the Builder of any discussion about the duty

4

See, Brief of Appellants, Exhibit D, pg. 4.
3

element in footnote 10 of their Memorandum in Opposition to Woodside's Motion for
Sunimaiy Judgmeiii. (I\ HI ,'I 1 I I he builder argued noting to the contrary in its Reply
Memorandum in Sun-ort of Woodsulc"^ MHHMI toi Mmimaiy jutkuiienl. (R a! T»S- /I'V'I »
Thus, for purposes of the present appeal, this element of the Homeowners' fraud ch-1- .s
has been met,
• - >>.- ., ..- :: •. . i, . , .idi. supreme I * .,u has heiu dint "a developer has
a du'^ iu disclose lu iii- ^nv!in>,

• '.«

-

. - mabK ought lo

know makes the subdivded lots unsuitable for such residential building .. .*" l.ovcland v.
Orcni City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (citation omitv.u;.
'*.:.' *ih: •; .--.i:- i- - .-r:\. KK isokiiwiis nave expressly held that a seller with
knowledge of defee<. • ! uc .-

: /'v.

,:. , ; . - . • -

*

defects. For example, Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 dN.J. lyv ;

.-

--. . :>. sa^
'

: • ^ i*

of new homes 'failed to disclose to homebuyers that it developed their homes near an
abai idoned hazardous s\ aste dump ' I he Strawn court IK ... mat i He builder-developer
is also liable for nondisclosure oi oii-siicplr. ,.
*•• dr ^ i - kiu»uu w i. a:id
unknown and not readily observable by the bir ei -1 die existence of tho-c
conditions is of sufficient materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of
the property and,, therefore, render the property substantially less desirable to the
objectively reasonable buyer.
--

!

**'*••

!

••- Mj.ii\wj. wOurt noted that, "1 here is no logical reason

why a certain ciasb of sellers and b^ol* cr^ <- ..ould not disclose off site matters that
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materially affect the value of property." Id at 430. In Tobin v. Paparone Construction
Ca, 137 N.J. Super. 518, 526 (1975), the seller of residential property was held liable for
failing to disclose its knowledge that tennis courts would be constructed on an adjoining
property. In Timm v. Clement, 574 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa App. 1997), the defendant-seller
sold the plaintiff-buyers property contaminated with petroleum products and which was
near underground storage tanks, both of which the defendant failed to disclose to the
plaintiff. In imposing "a duty on a seller to disclose latent defects located on property
owned by the seller, but off-site the property to be sold" the Timm court held that, "The
facts of this case place an even more obvious duty on Clement than the seller in Strawn
[cited above] to disclose off-site conditions. Here, the off-site conditions were on
property owned by Clement, The property abutted the property he sold to Timms." Id at
371-72 (emphasis added). In Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp.. 182 Cal. App. 2d 325
(1960), the seller-defendant sold a house to the plaintiff-buyer which was constructed on
fill and was in the area of an ancient slide and an area of underground water, which the
seller was aware of from a soil report. The Buist court held that the seller-defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff-seller to disclose both the on-site and off-site conditions. Id
at 330. In O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp.. 542 A.2d 333 (Conn. App. 1988), the seller
was held liable to the buyer for failing to disclose the existence of a water well near the
property sold. The court noted that a jury had found in interrogatories that the seller knew
5

o f the existence of the well, had a duty to disclose it, and failed to do so, which the court
c • ' tred forms the essence of a fi audulent in isrepresentai:oi; i ^ a; ; : ; r ? >. See also,
Campbell, Colin, annotation, Luhihi\ u; \ eudor 01 Real-h statu Broker ior l-aiiuic u»
Disclose Information Concerning Off-Site Conditions Affecting Value of properly -tl
:

•

.

. -u>).

.

..^- ..^^vCvu Uui\ .. :<> . .K, Knowledge oi the adjacent

soil conditions, but the above L . -: ;: 11? - •
the same to the Homeowners according to Utah and courts from other jurisdictions.
C

I "HE COLLAPSIBLE SOIL IN THE CHURCH SITE IS MATERIAL
INFORMATION

disclosed/concealed information was materidL. . '

^

l

continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information," (emphasis in
original), its Mem.orand.uni Decision does not expressly state that information regarding
collapsible soils in Ihr acijiunJIIIJJ Church Kite \\ tiiiifeiril
A matter can be said to be material if it is one upon which n rensonubk.1 m;in w 011M
attach importance in determining h is choice of action in the transaction. 3 Restatement of
'

:;

s- =;.K* ••• -

i/z-i/'b. ' V " r

- '-**

* ^i.ciicuu Jurisprudence 2d 236-240, Fraud and Deceit, §§
"

^u\;.;i ; ../iviiigenceand

prudence would think to be of some importance in determining *• i- 5':
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Hermansen. 48 P.3d at 242 (citation omitted). The "question of materiality as it relates to
the importance or significance of the omitted information is, at least on one level, a
factual issue to be determined by the jury." State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah
1993). The Strawn court also held that, "A 'material fact' is not confined to conditions
on the premises." Strawn, 657 A.2d at 429.
Regarding the conditions of the adjacent Church Site as contained in the Delta
Report, the Builder's own realtor even testified that he would have liked to have the Delta
Report when selling the lots in Homeowners' subdivision:
Q: Would you like to have this [Delta Report] when you're selling those
properties?
A: Yeah.
Q: How come?
A: Well, I think for myself and anyone else that, like we're disclosing now,
anything in and around the area if they had any concerns, it would be important for
them to know."
(R at 569.) To hold that information regarding collapsible soils directly underlaying the
House is material to the Homeowners, but information regarding collapsible soil in the
adjoining lot is not material to the homeowners is illogical as noted by the Strawn court
above. Geologic hazards do not obey arbitrary property lines. Clearly geologic hazards
follow their own will. A company as experienced in home construction as Builder cannot
assume deep collapsible soils at the Church Site suddenly stop at the boundaries of
adjacent lots, especially after receiving complaints from the Homeowners regarding
7

settlement problems, as well as other nearby property owners like the Seawrights (see.
Brief of Appellants at 3 4 )
Builder claims that the field report and visual iiispaliun h\ its cfuiitkvt SOIIKIHIW
supersedes and washes away all its knowledge of the nearby collapsible soil in the
acijonaiig U;di. : t ML^. 1 lowever, Builder did not get the field report from its engineer
u. *

•"' -—.a

./.•

/\ ;;••.: i. 4

: .•>.;,..] ;.;:

;\-.. :

Homeowners had aireadv sinned a contract to nur^H-v fSr-

. t ;Ji was months after
' • -.i-stion and have

Builder build the House on said lot. Builder could have (and should have) thus at any
time .iun.ig wie negotiations and closing of the sale in question informed the Homeowners
*

,

• t-. K\^

ni

lM-

|! „ (| o n f i i i K •

Further, it should not be up to the Birlc!^ ( -r '••

* -

«

VI.M-

if a soils report is somehow no longer valid or material due to a subsequent report:,,
especially when the two reports are on different, (but adjoining) pieces of land, and are
n

^ e n

i\ ^

• - • • ! / . • •

In sum, material ity is inherently a factual issue i o appropriate for si 1111 mai y

I he Delta Report discussed invasive soils testing such as boring holes tens of feet
down lo ascertam the composition and location of underlying soil and bedrock. The field
rcr^r by the Builder's engineer was a visual report: made by the engineer viewing the
excavation. Clearly, even though Builder excavated down approximately five feet, hengineer cannot view the soil six feet down, ten feet down or twenty feet down. In ti c
end, the Homeowners' had the soil under the House tested, which revealed ir- - - •
of collapsible soil under parts of the House. (R at" 1 "' * ! !
8

judgment. Further, any holding that collapsible soil underlying a lot is material but
collapsible soil in an adjoining lot is not is illogical and unreasonable. Finally, Builder's
subsequent visual field report cannot be used to erase the materiality of the prior invasive
soils testing embodied in the Delta Report. Accordingly, issues of fact exist regarding the
materiality element of the Homeowners' fraud claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, issues of fact exist regarding the Homeowners' fraud
claims based on Builder's knowledge of the soil underlying the adjoining Church Site,
which was material and which it had a duty to disclose to the Homeowners. The Court
should thus overrule the Trial Court's award of summary judgment and remand this case
for further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^L/ \ day of May, 2004
Z, L.C.

Skpu^iQuesenberry
J. Bryasi Quesenberry
Attorneys for Appellants
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